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Utilizing a unique term “shared responsibility,” the Florida legislature, by enacting Florida
Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)(3), has joined the expanding number of states authorizing the elevation
of joint custody to a preferred status.
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I. Introduction
Utilizing a unique term "shared responsibility," the Florida legis-
lature, by enacting Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)(3),' has joined
1. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1982) (effective July 1, 1982).
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the expanding number of states2 authorizing the elevation of joint cus-
tody to a preferred status.3 The words "joint custody" are conspicu-
ously and intentionally absent in the wording of the statute.4 The ab-
sence allows courts to continue the exercise of broad discretionary
powers when determining custody disputes involving children in Flor-
ida." This statute establishes as the public policy of this state that each
2. The total number of states with some form of joint custody statute is 23: Cali-
fornia (CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-56 (1980)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1982)); Hawaii (HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 571-46.1 (1980)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1982)); Iowa (IowA CODE
ANN. § 598.21 (West 1979) (effective July 1, 1982)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60.1610(b) (1979)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.270(3) (1980)); Louisiana (LA.
CiV. CODE ANN. art. 146, 157 (West 1981)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
214 (1981)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1981));
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6a) (1981)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.17 (West 1981)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1981)); Ne-
vada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.140 (1981)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458.17 (1982)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4.9 (1981)); North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (1975)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04
(1981)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1979)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 1002 (Purdon 1981)); Texas (TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon
1979)); and Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.24(1)(b) (West 1977)).
Arizona had authorized joint custody awards by court rule. In Illinois,
New Jersey and New York, court decisions broadly interpreted the lan-
guage of existing custody statutes as giving the courts discretionary power
to grant joint custody in appropriate cases. . . bringing the total number
of states that have embraced the concept of joint custody to 27.
Joint Custody Legislation Passed By 23 States, 8 FAM. L. REP., June 29, 1982, at
2506, 2507.
3. Id. at 2506.
4. "In fact, the new law studiously avoids using the term "joint custody" in order
to escape the detrimental connotations which that term may convey. . . ." Barkett,
From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Overview, in ANATOMY OF SHARED PAREN-
TAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.3a (Fla. Bar C.L.E. Course Manual 1982).
But see FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (1972) concerning natural guardians. The term
"joint custody" appears in this statute, but a definition is not provided nor have courts
in Florida used this statute as authorization for joint custody. The statute states in
part: "[I]f the marriage between the parents is dissolved, the natural guardianship shall
belong to the parent to whom custody of the child is awarded. If the parents are given
joint custody, then both shall continue as natural guardians." Id. (emphasis added).
5. Judge Fleet of the First Circuit Court of Florida, stated on January 25, 1982
during his testimony in front of the Florida Judiciary Civil Committee meeting discuss-
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minor child shall have frequent and continuing contact with both par-
ents after a dissolution of marriage and that both parents shall be en-
couraged "to share the rights and responsibilities of child-rearing."6
Generally, joint custody statutes lack specific standards or criteria
upon which the court can look for guidance in making custody determi-
nations.7 However, Florida's statute sets forth a non-exclusive list of
specific factors for the court's consideration and evaluation.8
A conceptual analysis of shared responsibility is the focus of this
note. A historical prospective of case law in Florida will highlight the
reasons for the significant changes in the newly enacted statute. The
legislature's textual changes will be discussed, in addition to a consider-
ation of the potential ramifications of the changes mandated. Based on
this analysis, recommendations are offered to facilitate the incorpora-
tion of shared responsibility into the area of child custody in Florida.
II. The Evolution of Florida Statutes Section 61.13
The 1967 amendment of Florida Statutes section 61.13 dealt with,
as does the present statute, the court's power in determining custody of
children in dissolution proceedings:
In any action for divorce and alimony, the court has power at any
stage of the action to make such orders about the care, custody and
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and what security, if
any, is to be given thereof, as from the circumstances of the parties
and the nature of the case is equitable.9
ing Senate Bill 439 (adopted as FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1982)): "Under the present law,
the judges (the trial judges), could do what this bill provides. I think this bill attempts
to generate some extra thinking on the parts of judges to get them thinking more on
the lines of sharing parental responsibilities ... it makes them think a little deeper
and rightfully so." Id.
6. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1 (1982). The statute states in part: "It is the public
policy of this state to assure each minor child frequent and continuing contact with
both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and to en-
courage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child-rearing." Id.
7. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982).
8. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a)-(j) (1982).
9. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1967).
2791
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This amendment renumbered former Florida Statutes section
65.14 as section 61.13 and substituted the word "equitable" in lieu of
"may be fit, equitable and just, and such order touching their custody
as their best spiritual as well as other interests may require."10 Spiri-
tual interests never again receive the attention of the legislature as a
factor in determining custody."'
The 1971 amendment 12 provided a substantial rewording of Flor-
ida Statutes section 61.13. The prior text of section 61.13 became sub-
section (3). In subsection (2), the legislature codified the best interests
of the child test's and gave the father equal standing with the mother
in regard to custody.1 4 Although the legislature had not yet enumerated
the relevant factors 5 to be considered in determining the best interests
of the child, courts, while exercising their discretion in deciding cus-
tody, continued to articulate factors they considered important. 8 Some
10. FLA. STAT. § 65.14 (1965).
11. Florida Statutes section 61.13(3) (1982) has two sub-sections under which a
court may include "spiritual interests" in determining custody: "(f) The moral fitness
of the parents" or "(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute." Id.
12. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1971).
13. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2) (1971) read in part: "The court shall award
custody and visitation rights of minor children of the parties as a part of proceeding for
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the best interests of the child ... " Id.
See also infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
14. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2) (1971) read in part: "Upon considering all
relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the
mother in determining custody." Id. See also infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
But see Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975), in which the Supreme Court
of Florida announced this statutory mandate of equal consideration was not inconsis-
tent with the tender years presumption in favor of the mother. It was still the case law
in Florida that "other essential factors being equal, the mother of the infant of tender
years should receive prime consideration for custody." Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22,
24 (Fla. 1975).
15. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(preference of the mature child); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (tender years); Jacobs v. Ross, 304 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (stable environment); Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975) (remain-
ing in the marital home); Hosking v. Hosking, 318 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (social investigator's report); Silvestri v. Silvestri, 309 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (prior infidelity not a binding factor).
Nova Law Journal
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of these factors were codified in 197517 to define the best interests of
the child for the purpose of determining the custody of children follow-
ing a dissolution of marriage.18
In the last major amendment prior to the 1982 revisions, the legis-
lature, in 1978, authorized courts in dissolution proceedings to award
visitation rights to grandparents of a minor child.1 9 Not until the 1982
17. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1975).
18. Florida Statutes section 61.13 (1975) stated in part:
(3) For purposes of custody, the best interests of the child shall be deter-
mined by the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting
the best welfare and interests of the child including but not limited to the
following:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the par-
ents and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love, affec-
tion, and guidance and to continue the educating of the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care recognized and permit-
ted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material
needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environ-
ment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to
be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a
preference.
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
custody dispute.
Id.
19. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b) (1978) stated:
The court may award the grandparents visitation rights of a minor child if
it is deemed by the court to be in the child's best interest. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to require that grandparents be made parties or
given notice of dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grand-
parents have legal standing as "contestants" as defined in § 61.1306, Flor-
ida Statutes. No court shall order that a child be kept within the state or
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amendment, though, were grandparents awarded "legal standing to
seek judicial enforcement of such an award." 20
III. Historical Perspective: Florida Case Law Development
A. Scope of the Problem
Prior to a dissolution of marriage, both parents are considered
joint natural guardians of their minor children.2 1 They have joint and
equal rights of custody, care and control.2 2 Upon dissolution, 3 the
court, with the judge acting in his traditional role of parens patriae,2'
determines the division of those jointly held parental rights and obliga-
tions.2 5 Because of the dramatic increase in divorce,26 courts are in-
creasingly called upon to make difficult decisions regarding child cus-
tody;27 an incorrect determination can have a devastating effect upon
Id.
But see, e.g., Putnal v. Putnal, 392 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(Grandparents allowed to participate in postdissolution custody proceedings initiated by
the father).
20. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2.c. (1982).
21. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (1972).
22. Florida Statutes section 744.03(1) (1972) stated in part: "A guardian is one
to whom the law has entrusted the custody and control of the person or of the property,
or of both, of an incompetent." Id.
23. See supra note 4 for the text of Florida Statutes section 744.301(1) (1972).
24. Under the parens patriae doctrine the judge puts himself in the position of a
"wise, affectionate and careful parent," and makes his determination concerning the
child accordingly. This description appears in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34,
148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
25. A list of parental rights and obligations appears in Folberg & Graham, Joint
Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 523, 537-38 (1979). See
also Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 166, 147 So. 464, 466 (1933).
26. See, e.g., Note, Joint Custody: A Revolution in Child Custody Law?, 20
WASHBURN L.J. 326 (1981).
27. Child custody disputes are all too often tragic theatre. The parties ex-
perience all the agonies of characters from a Greek drama. This, in itself,
should give us cause to shudder; but there is more to the situation. A judge
who must decide these disputes and attorneys who must counsel and advo-
cate are all too frequently oracles without a hint of what to do. They are
often overwhelmed by what is asked of them. Prevailing law requires that
they focus on the "best interests of the child," but they are often ill-
6
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the child.2 8 In making these difficult decisions, courts through the years
have employed a variety of methods to ensure a proper placement of
the child.
B. Best Interests of the Child Test
The best interests of the child test" focuses on the child's interests
as the primary consideration." As early as 1913, the Supreme Court of
Florida enunciated the principles of the test in review of a custody
award.3 1 The court emphasized a need to examine the fitness and con-
dition of the parents in order to make a determination of what was best
for the welfare of the child.3 2 The court's discretion" was and contin-
equipped to do so. There is very little in the attorney's education and expe-
rience that prepares him to deal with such a delicate human matter; the
same is true of the judge.
Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental - Psychological Approach to Proof
and Decisionmaking, 12 WILLIAMET-TE L.J. 491 (1976).
See also Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
28. Note, supra note 26, at 327; Note, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Di-
vorced Parents, 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1084, 1092-93 (1979).
29. In Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) the Kansas Supreme Court fo-
cused on the welfare of the child, not the natural right of the father. Custody was
awarded to the maternal aunt who had raised the child from infancy, making this case
one of the earliest examples using the best interests of the child test.
30. In Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 249, 148 N.E. 624 (1925), Judge Cardozo
(quoting Queen v. Gyngall, 2 Q.B. Div. 232 (1893)) formulated the standard:
[The Judge] does not proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether
father or mother, has a cause of action against the other or indeed against
any one. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the
child. He is to put himself in the position of a "wise, affectionate and care-
ful parent" and make provision for the child accordingly . . . He is not
adjudicating a controversy between adversary parti6s, to compose their pri-
vate differences. He is not determining rights "as between a parent and a
child" or as between one parent and another. . . Equity does not concern
itself with such disputes in their relation to the disputants. Its concern is
for the child.
240 N.Y. at 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626.
31. Harris v. Harris, 65 Fla. 50, 61 So. 122 (1913) (custody of minor son
awarded to the mother).
32. Id.
If the character of either the father, .. or the mother, .. of said minor
child, shall become disreputable and unfit to have the care, custody, or
7
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ues to be broad in this area which reflects the gravity of a custody
decision. 4
The Florida Supreme Court in Green v. Green 5 reiterated the con-
trolling principle of the best interests of the child test: "We are com-
mitted to the doctrine that the welfare of the child is the principal fea-
ture in determining custody, and that a very large discretion is allowed
the chancellor in this respect." 36
The best interests of the child test remained a vague standard37
and a general approach 8 to Florida custody decisions until the legisla-
ture enumerated the factors for determining best interests in 1975.39
Prior to 1975, criteria courts eluded to included: (1) which parent
could provide emotional, social, and spiritual guidance;40 (2) a whole-
some moral atmosphere and suitable educational facilities;41 (3) stabil-
control of said child, or if their treatment of said child becomes other than
parental, then they shall forfeit or lose all their rights, powers and privi-
leges granted in this decree, and said rights, powers and privileges herefore
belonging to said party shall revert to the other.
Id. at 50, 61 So. at 122.
33. Note, supra note 26, at 329.
This test, [referring to the best interests test], presupposes that it will be
best for the child. This supposition forces a judge "to evaluate and choose
between highly speculative and sharply conflicting 'expert' testimony re-
garding the personalities of the contestants and the predicted outcomes of
various custody alternatives." The judge brings to the decision his personal
opinions and feelings.
Id.
34. Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 166, 147 So. 464, 466 (Fla. 1933). The
court in Frazier noted that this discretion is subject to judicial review.
35. 137 Fla. 359, 188 So. 355 (1939) (custody of five year old daughter awarded
to mother).
36. Id. at 360, 188 So. at 356.
37. Note, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced Parents, supra note 28, at
1086: "The use of such a vague standard enables judges to rely on the mandates of
their own consciences."
38. Folberg & Graham, supra note 25, at 532.
39. FLA. STAr. § 61.13(3) (1975).
40. Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1975) (custody of two and one-
half year old twin girls awarded to the father).
41. Baxter v. Baxter, 158 Fla. 886, 888, 30 So. 2d 492, 494 (1947) (custody of
three year old son awarded to the father).
8
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ity and discipline;42 and (4) the advantage of the child remaining in the
same neighborhood and association with a peer group conducive to the
child's well-being.43 Fitness of the mother 4 and father45 were ex-
amined, and in rare instances when neither parent was considered fit,
custody was awarded to a non-parent.4 6 Alternative forms of custody
were also examined, for example, split custody or divided custody.47
The best interests of the child test continued to be the paramount
consideration for awarding custody after 1975,48 and should remain so
with the court's discretion intact under the newly enacted statute.4 9
42. Philips v. Philips, 153 Fla. 133, 134, 13 So. 2d 922, 923 (1943) (custody of
17 month old son awarded to the father).
43. Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(custody of boys ages four and six awarded to the mother).
44. Teel v. Sapp, 53 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1951) (mother morally unfit). But see
Norris v. Norris, 202 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (mother retained cus-
tody despite entertaining "nocturnal friends").
See also Green v. Green, 137 Fla. 359, 188 So. 355 (1939) (mother who devoted
considerable time to child's supervision and training).
45. See, e.g., Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975):
Even if the trier of fact determines that the spouse's adultery has an ad-
verse effect on the child, other factors, ie. cruelty, neglect, parental unfit-
ness, exhibited by the other spouse, may be present to tip the scales back
in favor of the award of custody to the adulterous spouse. In the latter
event, it may be that the best interest of the child would be served by
awarding custody to a third party.
Id. at 24.
46. Id. See, e.g., Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) (boy, eleven,
and girl, nine, awarded to the grandmother).
47. See, e.g., Shores v. Shores, 69 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1954) (policy of the court to
keep the children together - no "split" custody); Jones v. Jones, 23 So. 2d 623 (Fla.
1945) (welfare of the children not best promoted by ordering divided custody between
the parents).
48. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 365 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (nine year old son awarded to the father who could provide a more stable
environment).
49. Florida Statutes section 61.13(3) (1982) states:
For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary physical resi-
dence, the best interests of the child shall be determined by the court's
consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best welfare and
interests of the child, including, but not limited to: (a) ... to (j) Any
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C. Tender Years Doctrine
Early English5" and American "1 courts viewed paternal custody as
a virtually absolute rule.52 Later, however, under the tender years doc-
trine, the mother of a minor child received custody unless it was
shown she was not a "fit and proper person" to rear the children." This
became known as the "Other Things Being Equal Rule" in Florida,"
meaning that presented with two equally fit parents requesting custody
of a young child, courts would elect the mother.
When custody of a young child was awarded to the father, the
welfare of the child under the best interests of the child test superceded
the doctrine56 or the "other factors" were not found to be equal as
between the parents. 57 Employment of the tender years doctrine meant
Id.
50. See, e.g., The King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (1804) (custody of
infant awarded to father).
51. See, e.g., Carr v. Carr, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 168 (1872) (custody of three year
old child awarded to father).
52. The shift to favoring the mother began with Justice Talfourd's Act, 2 & 3
Vict., ch. 54 (1839). Custody could be awarded to the mother if the children were less
than seven years old. This Act is the origin of the "Tender Years Doctrine" in Eng-
land. Note, supra note 26, at 328.
53. Helms v. Fransiscus, 2 Bland's Ch. 544 (Md. 1830), quoted in Note, supra
note 26, at 328, provides what is considered the first American expression of the tender
years doctrine:
[Even] a court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in
contempt and snatch helpless, pulling infancy from the bosom of an affec-
tionate mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the father. The mother
is the softest and safest nurse in infancy, and with her it will be left in
opposition to this general right of the father.
Id. at 563.
54. Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 526, 23 So. 2d 623, 625 (Fla. 1945) (boy, six,
and girl, four, awarded to mother).
55. Fields v. Fields, 143 Fla. 886, 197 So. 153 (1940) (three children, ages three,
five and seven, awarded to mother): "Other things being equal ... the mother of in-
fants of tender years is best fitted to bestow the motherly affection, care, companion-
ship, and early training suited to their needs." Id. at 887, 197 So. at 154.
56. Philips v. Philips, 153 Fla. 133, 13 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1943) (custody of 17
month old son awarded to father).
57. See, e.g., Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400, 401-02 (Fla. 1972) (custody to
father of sons six, eight and ten).
286 Nova Law Journal
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"the pendulum of custody has swung from father to mother and has
finally centered upon the principal question of the welfare of the
child." 8
After the 1971 Amendment to Florida Statutes section 61.13(2), 59
the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles of the tender years
doctrine despite the statutory mandate of equal consideration for both
the mother and father in custody disputes.60 Despite the statute's ex-
press statement, it was still the case law in Florida that "other essential
factors being equal, the mother of the infant of tender years should
receive prime consideration for custody.""1
However, in 1975, the legislature amended Florida Statutes sec-
tion 61.13(3)62 to include criteria to be considered when determining
the welfare and best interests of the child. Courts then began use of
those factors to apply "equal consideration.""3 The 1982 amendment to
Florida Statutes section 61.13 states: "Upon considering all relevant
factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as
the mother in determining custody regardless of the age of the
child.""e Thus, the Florida legislature has expressly eviscerated the his-
torical and judicially followed tender years doctrine.6 5
58. Id. at 402.
59. See supra note 14 for the text of Florida Statutes section 61.13(2) (1971).
60. Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1975).
61. Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1975). See also Corvison v.
Corvison, 362 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (custody of six year old and
three year old awarded to mother). But see Snedaker v. Snedaker, 327 So. 2d 72 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (custody of three year old awarded to father):
When, as here, there is a dearth of evidence in support of the position of
the mother, as opposed to overwhelming evidence indicating that it is for
the best interests of the child for its custody to be awarded to its father,
any 'presumption', 'prime consideration', or 'natural edge', abiding with
the mother is overcome and custody should be awarded to that parent in
whose custody the best interests of the child will be served, in the light of
the evidence adduced.
Id. at 73.
62. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1975).
63. Kerschner v. Crocker, 400 So. 2d 126, 127 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(custody of five year old daughter awarded to the father).
64. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)l. (1982) (emphasis added).
65. Two open questions remain:
a) Since the 1982 amendment excludes the "sex" of the child as a factor for equal
2871
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D. Modification of Custody
Modification of custody, whether originally determined by an
agreement between the parties6 or by court decree,67 traditionally has
been the "proper subject for judicial consideration at any time by the
court which granted the decree of divorce."6 Since the award of cus-
tody is regarded as res judicata69 as of the time of the decree, the court
does not have the same degree of discretion to choose between the par-
ents seeking modification as it did upon the initial custody
determination.7
0
To warrant modification of a child custody decree, changed cir-
cumstances is the threshold requirement.7 1 In order to warrant up-
consideration in its text of § 61.13(2)(b)1., will a mother still have the "natural edge"
to be awarded a daughter? See, e.g., Silvestri v. Silvestri, 309 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975).
b) Since most custody arrangements are by agreement, will the mother still con-
tinue to be given "prime consideration" anyway by those unaware of the new statutory
mandate: "Even though the tender years doctrine is waning, its effects are still present.
In about 90% of custody cases, the mother is awarded sole custody, and the mother
assumes sole custody in at least 90% of the cases that never reach the court." Note,
supra note 26, at 328.
66. See, e.g., Forte v. Forte, 320 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975): "In-
terpretation or modification of a separate agreement affecting welfare of children is not
only permissible, but obligatory where the circumstances so indicate." Id. at 448.
67. See, e.g., Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1963) (en banc): "So long, then,
as the minor child is within the jurisdiction of the equity court, such court may exercise
its continuing jurisdiction to modify its decree as to the custody of the child, even
though jurisdiction was not expressly retained therein." Id. at 908.
68. Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 165, 147 So. 2d 464, 465 (1933), reh'g
denied, April 19, 1933; Green v. Green, 307 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
69. But see, Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974): "Res
judicata does not fit in custody matters, yet some barrier must be raised against too
frequent petitions for modification." Id. at 49.
70. Green v. Green, 307 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Courts are reluctant to disrupt a child's environment unless the circumstances
clearly call for it. Arguably, therefore, a clear advantage goes to the parent who wins
the initial custody determination, even if it is only a temporary custody determination
until the actual dissolution proceedings.
71. Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Philips v.
Philips, 13 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 1943). See also, Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 2d at
464.
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rooting the child, there must be competent, substantial evidence that
(1) there has been a substantial or material change in the conditions of
the parties and (2) that the best interests and welfare of the child will
be promoted by the change of custody. 2 Although a heavy burden is
placed upon the parent seeking modification, 73 it can be justified by the
protection of the child from disruption caused by too frequent modifica-
tion petitions.7 '
Factors considered in making a determination of change of cus-
tody have included, but are not limited to: (1) preference of a mature
child,75 (2) psychological evaluation, "6 (3) stability of the living envi-
ronment,77 (4) sexual activity and cohabitation of the custodial par-
[The final decree] is not to be materially amended or changed afterward,
unless on altered conditions shown to have arisen since the decree, or be-
cause of material facts bearing on the question of custody and existing at
the time of the decree, but which were unknown to the court, and then
only for the welfare of the child.
Frazier, 109 Fla. at 164-65, 147 So. 2d at 464-65.
72. Sanders v. Sanders, 376 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See
also, Bennett v. Bennett, 73 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1954); Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 23
So. 2d 623 (1945); Brush v. Brush, 414 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Adams v. Adams, 385 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Jacobs v. Ross, 304
So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). But see, Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So. 2d
106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (discussing Hutchins v. Hutchins, 220 So. 2d 438,
439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969)):
The Fourth District Court in Hutchins did state that in modification of
child custody cases a showing must be made "not only that the general
welfare of the children will be served by a change of custody, but that it
will be detrimental to the children if custody is not changed."
Goodman, 291 So. 2d at 108.
73. See, e.g., Stricklin v. Stricklin, 383 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980); McGregor v. McGregor, 7 Fla. Law Weekly 1656 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Aug.
4, 1982) (No. 81-568).
74. Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). But see,
Prevatt v. Penney, 138 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962): "Custody of the child
has been a continuing series of rounds characterized by animosity, charges and coun-
tercharges." Id. at 539.
75. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
76. Garvey v. Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). But
see the dissent in Green v. Green, 307 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
criticizing the use of counselor's investigation as a factor in determining custody.
77. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 365 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
reh'g denied, January 3, 1979.
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ent, 7 and (5) changed needs of an older child.79 Remarriage of a non-
custodial parent, as well as increased material wealth and acquisition of
a suitable home have not been found sufficient in and of themselves to
fulfill the requirement of changed circumstances.80 Finally, it is the
trend in Florida that a custodial parent need not be proven unfit to
have any factors in "changed circumstances" considered in a modifica-
tion petition.8 '
The majority of past petitions for change of custody requested a
transfer from sole custody in one parent to sole custody in another.8 2 In
cases in which the non-custodial parent requested split or divided cus-
tody,83 the burden and factors used by the court remained the same.
84
The newly enacted statute mandates shared responsibility as part
of any proceeding under the chapter85 unless the court finds that shared
parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child's best inter-
est.88 It remains an open question whether the court will continue to
follow the prior enumerated standards in a modification petition.
7
78. Smothers v. Smothers, 281 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1973); Young v. Young, 305 So.
2d 92 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
79. McGregor v. McGregor, 7 Fla. Law Weekly 1656 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 4, 1982) (No. 81-568).
80. Adams v. Adams, 385 So. 2d 688, 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Strick-
lin v. Stricklin, 383 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). But see, Hoffman v.
Linley, 201 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (mother was original custodian,
lost custody upon a finding of unfitness, and finally upon re-petition after remarriage
was again awarded custody).
81. Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
82. See supra note 72.
83. See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Ross, 304 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
85. 1982 FLA. LAWS ch. 82-96 (amending § 61.13(2)(b)3. (1982)).
86. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982).
87. Two additional open questions remain:
a) Will courts now entertain modification petitions of once "boiler-
plate" sole custody agreements, thereby flooding the courts?
b) Is the newly enacted Florida Statutes section 61.13 (1982) alone
enough of a changed circumstance to reach the threshold requirement for
a modification petition?
14
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E. Grandparent Visitation Rights
Historically in Florida, grandparents were treated as any other
non-parents and were denied visitation rights.88 Courts recognized the
emotional bonds between the grandparents and grandchildren, yet
found visitation rights were unjustified and unenforceable. 89 Until
1978, when legislation9 ° was passed permitting an award of visitation if
it was in the child's best interests, visitation rights of grandparents
were always struck down by courts.9 1
88. In Parker v. Gates, 89 Fla. 76, 103 So. 126 (1925), the Supreme Court re-
fused visitation rights to a non-parent who had raised a nine year old child for most of
his life. The court enunciated the principle cited numerously to deny grandparents and
non-parents visitation rights: "[t]he order. . . cannot legally be enforced against the
wishes of the child's mother." Id. at 76, 103 So. at 126.
89. See, e.g., Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967):
This decision . . . need not operate to prevent the maternal grandmother
from seeing the child, for whom she has shown great interest and affection,
nor deprive the child of the benefit and pleasure to be derived therefrom
...(but) the father and his wife - he as a natural parent and she as a
parent by adoption are entitled to determine the frequency, time and the
place of visitation with the child ..
Id. at 573.
See also Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 295 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Sheehy v. Sheehy, 325 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Tamargo v. Tamargo,
348 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). In all cases, custody was had by fit
parents. But see Behn v. Tummons, 345 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
which recognized the authority of the trial court to award custody to grandparents and
non-parents limited to cases in which either or the parents are unfit to raise the child.
90. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b) (1978) read in part:
The court may award the grandparents visitation rights of a minor child if
it is deemed by the court to be in the child's best interest. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to require that grandparents be made parties or
given notice of dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grand-
parents have legal standing as "contestants" as defined in § 61.1306, Flor-
ida Statutes. No court shall order that a child be kept within the state or
jurisdiction of the court solely for the purpose of permitting visitation for
the grandparents.
Id.
See also Florida Statutes section 61.1306(1) (1977) which defines, "contestant" as
follows: "(1) 'Contestant' means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to
custody or visitation rights with respect to a child."
91. See supra note 89.
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Since the grandparents could now only be heard in the context of a
divorce or custody proceeding, 92 this lack of standing as contestants 3 to
maintain an independent civil action to achieve visitation rights, effec-
tively continued to cause denial of those rights.94
Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(c) 95 now provides that necessary
legal standing and should therefore fulfill the legislature's intent to pro-
vide for the best interests of the child.98 It remains to be seen whether
the legislature shall follow the trend begun to extend visitation rights to
non-parents, other relatives of the child.97
92. See supra note 90.
93. See supra note 90.
94. Osteryoung v. Leibowitz, 371 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979),
reh'g denied, July 5, 1979; Shuler v. Shuler, 371 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979). But see Whitehead v. Hewett, 380 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
reh'g denied, March 18, 1980 (award of visitation rights to grandparents held not an
abuse of discretion as grandparents were legal custodians under a prior order and mod-
ification proceedings were instituted by the child's father); Putnal v. Putnal, 392 So. 2d
613 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court concluded that in entertaining a joint motion
allowing grandparents participation in a proceeding initiated by the father, in which he
and another couple were contestants, the trial court did not err. It added the trial court
would have erred had it refused to allow the grandparents to participate).
Against all prior precedent and without a statutory basis (as grandparents then
had), a non-parent was granted visitation rights on the basis of the child's best inter-
ests. See Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), in which the
court in a dissolution proceeding granted a step-mother visitation rights with her hus-
band's adopted daughter.
95. 1982 FLA. LAWS ch. 82-96 (effective July, 1982).
96. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(c) (1982) states in part: "The court may
award the grandparents visitation rights of a minor child if it is deemed by the court to
be in the child's best interest. Grandparents shall have legal standing to seek judicial
enforcement of such an award."
See also 7 FAM. L. REP., Trends In Grandparent Third-Party Visitation Rights
Legislation, July 21, 1981, at 2587:
As the nation's divorce rate has climbed, the issue of grandparents' visita-
tion rights has grown in importance. Out of concern for maintaining a
family relationship that can provide emotional security for the children of
divorced parents, most states over the last decade have considered legisla-
tion to establish procedures by which grandparents and other family mem-
bers can petition for visitation rights.
Id. at 2587.
97. Other relatives may include "great-grandparents, stepparents, half-brothers
and half-sisters." Trends In Grandparent Third-Party Visitation Rights Legislation,
16
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F. Alternative Forms of Custody
While the norm in Florida has been to grant sole custody to the
mother,98 courts, upon considering individual circumstances, have also
awarded sole custody to the father." The best interests of the child test
has been the basis for the courts to order "divided" custody, "rotating
or alternating" custody. 100 The various terms are used interchangeably
and inexactly in courts in Florida.10 1 Case law in Florida has dealt al-
most exclusively with forms of "divided" custody, where one parent is
still the sole custodian over a distinct period of time.
The Florida Supreme Court in 1933,102 recognized a father must
be afforded an opportunity to exercise his paternal rights10 3 and be-
supra note 96, at 2587.
98. See, e.g., Shores v. Shores, 60 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1954); Teel v. Sapp, 53 So.
2d 635 (Fla. 1951).
99. See, e.g., Jobe v. Jobe, 202 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Klein
v. Klein, 204 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), reh'g denied, December 12,
1967.
100. These terms need to be distinguished from each other. Divided (or alternat-
ing or rotating) custody is when each parent has sole custody of the child for a distinct
portion of the year. The parent in whose home the child resides has sole legal authority
(care, custody and control) during that period. Of course, the other parent has visita-
tion rights. Split custody refers to "the situation where custody of one or more children
is awarded to one parent and the remaining children to the other parent." Gerscovich
v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1151-53 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
Joint custody "leaves the parental rights and obligations toward the child the same
as existed during the marriage. . . both parents have equal authority and responsibil-
ity for all facets of raising the child. . . the child's upbringing is a cooperative project;
both parents agree on the important decisions concerning the child's life. . . . Joint
custody entails the division of physical custody at relatively brief intervals, with the
child's time roughly divided equally between the parents and spread evenly throughout
the year." Note, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced Parents, supra note 28, at
1104-05.
101. Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
102. In Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464 (1933) both parents were,
under the divorce decree, afforded six months each with the eleven year old daughter.
The modification order only allowed the father two weeks visitation.
103. The father is not only entitled to have "leave" for the child to visit
him for two weeks each year, but is entitled to have and enjoy her society
for a reasonably sufficient length of time each year to enable him to incul-
cate in her mind a spirit of love, affection, and respect for her father. . ..
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cause neither parent was considered a "good example of conduct or
character, ' 104 the court approved a divided custody plan.10 5 Ten years
later the Supreme Court 06 made an about face and took a definitive
stand against divided custody:
There can be no doubt that experience shows that it is detrimental
to the best interests of a young child to have its custody and control
shifted often from one household to another and .to be changed
often from the discipline and teachings which are attempted to be
imparted by one custodian to that other discipline and teachings
sought to be imparted by another custodian. . . .It has been writ-
ten on the pages of all time that no man can serve two masters and
it is certainly true that no child can pursue a normal life when
subjected to the precepts, example and control of first one person
and then another, regardless of how well intentioned those persons
may be. 107
In another vacillation later that same year, the Florida Supreme Court
approved a divided custody award because both parents "were of highly
respectable character." 10 8
On the whole, the case law presumption in Florida against divided
custody was reaffirmed numerous times by the Supreme Court 09 and
Parental rights of the father growing out of the father's legal responsibil-
ity, as well as recognized moral obligation, to maintain and care for both
the mother and their children, when other considerations do not materially
preponderate against it in the interest of the welfare of children must be
accorded due consideration by a court in making an order, as to the cus-
tody of children heretofore enjoyed by the father.
Id. at 167, 147 So. at 467.
104. Id. at 167, 147 So. at 467.
105. Id. The daughter would spend nine months with the mother and three
months with the father.
106. Phillips v. Phillips, 153 Fla. 133, 13 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1943).
107. Id. at 134, 13 So. 2d at 923.
108. Watson v. Watson, 153 Fla. 668, 669, 15 So. 2d 446, 447 (1943) (emphasis
added). The children would spend six months with the mother and six months with the
father. A major factor was the fact both parents worked. The court stated: "This case
is typical of many that have from time to time changed the current of some phase of
the law;" the mother's working caused her to lose her preferential standing. Id.
109. Hurst v. Hurst, 158 Fla. 43, 27 So. 2d 749 (1946) (en banc) (tender years
doctrine used to invalidate divided custody), reh'g denied, Nov. 19, 1946; Jones v.
18




the district courts of appeal. 110 Despite this reaffirmation, courts did
express approval of divided custody in certain situations having "special
circumstances or legally unequal facts."111 Thus divided custody was
not absolutely prohibited, and various forms were awarded by the
courts.112 The test seemed to be a weighing of factors including the
desire of the parties to have divided custody, the proximity of custodial
domiciles, the reasonableness of the periods of divided custody, the ages
and preference of the children, and, especially, the specific circum-
stances of each case.
1 1 3
Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 23 So. 2d 623 (1945).
110. Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (not
in best interests of child due to mutual antagonism between the parents); Garvey v.
Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("joint" custody order reversed
based on psychologist's report); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Unger v. Unger, 306 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Ritzi v.
Ritzi, 160 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Rudolph v. Rudolph, 146 So. 2d
397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (best interests of child used to invalidate divided
custody).
111. Wonsetler, 240 So. 2d at 871.
112. Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(parents to alternate custody of eleven year old girl and fifteen year old boy on a yearly
basis), as clarified, Dec. 7, 1981; Forman v. Forman, 315 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (mother to share joint custody of minor son with maternal grandparents),
reh'g denied, July 22, 1975; Hare v. Potter, 233 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1970) (remanded to determine periods of custody), reh'g denied, Apr. 30, 1970; Lin-
dgren v. Lindgren, 220 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (mother and father
alternate custody four days one week and three days the next week of twin daughters);
Bolton v. Gordon, 201 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (mother awarded
custody nine months to coincide with school year and father to have custody during the
three summer months); Udell v. Udell, 151 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.'App. 1963)
(joint custody awarded to both parents of thirteen year old and the court would "pro-
vide definite periods of time that each parent should have custody of this child if they
could not agree among themselves as to the hours of custody, etc." Id. at 865); Hutch-
inson v. Hutchinson, 127 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (father awarded
custody during school term and mother awarded custody during summer vacation);
Metz v. Metz, 108 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (father allowed to have
daughter with him in his home outside state during part of the summer vacation), reh'g
denied, Feb. 16, 1959.
See also, Brown v. Brown, 7 Fla. Law Weekly (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 24,
1982) (No. 82-771) (for award of split custody: fourteen year old daughter and sixteen
year old son to live with father, and three year old daughter to live with mother).
113. See, e.g., Gersovich v. Gersovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1151-52 (Fla. 5th
295[1Shared Parental Responsibility
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Since none of the above alternative forms of custody previously
awarded in Florida- totally embrace the concept of shared responsibil-
ity,11 4 the courts in Florida will be applying an innovative concept.
IV. The Concept of Shared Parental Responsibility: Florida
Statutes Section 61.13115
A. Purposes of the Amendments
The purposes of the 1982 amendments are set forth in Florida
Statutes section 61.13. The intent of the legislature is clearly stated:
"It is the public policy of this state to assure each minor child frequent
and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have sepa-
rated or dissolved their marriage and to encourage parents to share the
rights and responsibilities of child-rearing." 1 " This portion of the stat-
ute recognizes the child's right to have access to both parents 1 7 and
requires each parent to acknowledge and recognize the other as a full
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also supra note 103.
114. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982). It is impossible to determine the num-
ber of separation agreements between parents in Florida which may have heretofore
incorporated this concept as these are not reported.
115. On October 8, 1982, the Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education Commit-
tee and Family Law Section presented a lecture program called The Anatomy of
Shared Parental Responsibility. The speakers will be quoted extensively in this section.
Their statements will be reflected in footnotes by citation to their name. They were in
order of their presentations:
Honorable Rosemary Barkett, Circuit Judge, 15th Judicial Circuit, West Palm
Beach, Florida.
James Fox Miller, Attorney, Hollywood, Florida.
Honorable Frank A. Orlando, Circuit Judge, 17th Judicial Circuit, Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida.
Melvyn B. Frumkes, Attorney, Miami, Florida.
Honorable Lewis Kapner, Circuit Judge, 15th Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach,
Florida.
A course manual, also entitled ANATOMY OF SHARED PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY,
1982, was distributed and contained articles by the speakers above, as well as other
contributors [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. A copy of the MANUAL is on file in the
Nova Law Review office.
116. 1982 FLA. LAWS ch. 82-96 (effective July 1, 1982).
117. Judge Barkett.
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parent and partner in the rearing of the child.""8 Implicit in the statute
is the recognition of the need to reeducate lawyers, judges,11 9 parents,
and the public in this "emotional field of the law.1120 The problems
caused by sole custody 21 should be abrogated by the shared parenting
aspect of the statute.
Looking to the construction of the language of this section, as well
as all the other sections of Florida Statutes section 61.13, it becomes
evident that an entirely new vocabulary is now to be incorporated into
Florida domestic relations law.122 Custody disputes are not suited to the
adversary system. Custody is not a vested right or award "fostered by
the present system which has awarded the 'prize' to the 'winner'. 1 23
No longer will "custody be awarded" or "visitation rights" be
delineated.1 24
The statute has more depth than just the matter of the above
stated semantics - it focuses on the child and who will be responsible
for raising the child.1 25 The term "children" in the plural form has
been changed to "each [minor] child"126 used in the singular form, her-
118. Judge Kapner.
119. "The legislature addressed the concept of shared parental responsibility not
because the courts were making such awards in inappropriate cases but because some
courts refused to do so even when clearly warranted." Kapner, Shared Parental Re-
sponsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 5.12 (emphasis in
original).
120. James Fox Miller.
121. For example, (1) the stigma attached to a mother without custody, (2) that
fathers who were just "visitors" acted as such, (3) that mothers who were "custodians"
used that power against the fathers, and (4) the custody battles and contempt orders
that accompanied the former. Barkett, From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Over-
view, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.3(a).
122. Judge Barkett.
123. Barkett, From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Overview, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 1.3(a).
124. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) states "the court shall deter-
mine all matters relating to custody ... " The words "award custody and visitation
rights" were deleted.
Suggested new terminology includes "access and contact" instead of the word visi-
tation. Melvyn Frumkes.
125. Judge Barkett.
126. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) states in part: "The court
shall determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties. .. ."
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aiding a shift in focus from the needs of the children of a dissolved
marriage as an entity to be examined, to a recognition that each child's
needs in a family unit be examined separately to provide properly for
his welfare. 127
Since the purpose of the statute is to focus on each individual child
rather than rely on generalizations, the statute mandates the end of the
tender years doctrine.128 In this substantive change, the statute abro-
gated the judicial presumption that the mother of a child of tender
years shall be the designated custodian.129
Further reinforcement of the policy of encouraging shared partici-
pation in child-rearing can be found in Florida Statutes section
61.13(2)(b)3.130 By giving both parents access to all records and infor-
mation pertaining to a child, this section eliminates the "ownership"
aspect of child custody and makes possible effective co-parenting.,
Finally, by speaking in general terms of rights and responsibilities
of the child to be shared by the parents, the legislature, through Flor-
The word "children" was deleted.
127. "Florida courts have routinely held that it is error to divide children be-
tween parents. However, it is to be noted that Cha. 82-96 has reworded Section
61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes, from 'rights of children' to 'custody of each minor child.'
Does this subtle change indicate a legislative intent to abrogate the former case law?
Your authors take no position and will wait appellate clarification thereof." Knight &
Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.31.
128. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) states in part: "Upon consid-
ering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration
as the mother in determining custody regardless of the age of the child." (emphasis
added).
129. Judge Barkett.
Arguably, even though the legislature has mandated the demise of the tender
years doctrine, trial judges may continue to order custody of young children to
mothers, supporting it on theories of bonding between the mother and child due to the
care and feeding of tiny infants more typically done by the mother than by the father.
Even if there were evidence of shared responsibilities, some judges are constitutionally
more likely to believe that meaningful nurturing was done by the mother, i.e., if the
child was breast fed.
130. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)3. (1982) states: "Access to records and
information pertaining to a minor child, including but not limited to medical, dental
and school records, shall not be denied to a parent because such parent is not the
child's primary residential parent."
131. Barkett, From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Overview, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 1.3(b) and in presentation.
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ida Statutes section 61.13, "will signal to the public an expressed pub-
lic policy recognizing that divorcing parents do not divorce their chil-
dren in the process and that they continue to be jointly responsible for
them.,,ls2
B. Changes Mandated: The Statute and Its Implementation
1. Unrestricted Shared Parental Responsibility133
Florida Statutes section 61.13 creates a statutory presumption in
favor of sharing parental responsibility: "The Court shall order that
parental responsibility for a minor child shall be shared by both par-
ents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be
detrimental to the child. ' 13 Use of this mandatory language makes
clear that a simple custody-visitation arrangement is no longer viable in
Florida.13 5
"Shared parental responsibility is defined to mean "that both par-
ents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their
child, and requires both parents to confer so that major decisions af-
fecting the welfare of the child will be determined jointly. ' 13, Because
the statute specifically separates the areas of "primary physical resi-
dence [and] shared parental responsibility," 137 this amendment and
definition contemplate the concept of joint legal custody rather than the
term joint custody itself, which connotes a combination of joint legal
and joint physical custody.138 The absence of the term "joint custody"
in the statute and the use of clearly defined new vocabulary precludes
132. Id.
133. This term appears in the MANUAL at page 4.18, adopted from the guide-
lines prepared by the Family Law Division, 13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough
County, Florida. Its definition follows the statute stating "both parents retain legal
responsibility and authority for the control and care of their child as they did when the
family was intact." Id.
134. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982) (emphasis added).
135. Judge Barkett.
136. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2.a. (1982) (emphasis added). It is anticipated the
meaning of the emphasized words will be heavily litigated.
137. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1982).
138. Melvyn Frumkes, Judge Kapner. See also Knight & Pollock, Shared Pa-
rental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.5.
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any "preconceived connotations of shared parenting or joint custody"139
in Florida.
An order for shared parental responsibility may be established by
the court or by agreement by the parties,140 after review of the individ-
ual circumstances of each case.1 41 The best interests of the child re-
mains the primary consideration of the court.1 42 Because the parents
are in the best position to determine what is best for their own partici-
pation in child-rearing, agreements between the parents are en-
couraged.143 Therefore, there is no one "shared parental responsibility"
formula and arrangements will vary considerably.144
Courts consider a number of factors when determining whether
shared parenting is appropriate, including: (1) fitness of the parents, 145
139. Barkett, From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Overview, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 1.3(b).
140. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2.a. (1982) states in part: "In ordering
shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the expressed desires of the par-
ties. . . .Where it appears to the court to be in the best interests of the child, the
court may order or the parties may agree. . . ." (emphasis added).
141. Kapner, Shared Parental Responsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 5.41. See also pages 5.15 - .16 of the MANUAL quoting judicial
attitudes from a survey conducted among Florida Circuit Judges in 1977.
[V]irtually all the judges would grant shared parental responsibility, so as
defined, if the best interests of the children are served (95%), the parties
are agreeable to it (85%), or the children, being of sufficient age and ma-
turity, desire it, and the parties do not object (90%). The most popular
physical arrangement was nine months with one parent and three months
with the other. Most judges (80%) eschewed a general unspecified order of
shared parental responsibility or a six months - six months alternating ar-
rangement, and a slight majority opposed Monday through Thursday with
one parent and Friday to Monday with the other. Not surprisingly, the
more mature the parents and the better the parent-child relationships, the
more likely the judges were to order shared parental responsibility.
Id. at 5.15 - .16.
142. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
143. All the speakers stated this at one point in their discussions.
144. "The truth is that responsibility arrangements are as varied as are the situa-
tions and personalities of divorced parents, and more than one arrangement can be
fairly described as a 'true' shared parental responsibility arrangement." Kapner,
Shared Parental Responsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 5.2.
145. Id. at 5.23-.24.
Nova Law Journal 7:19831
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/3
17:1983 Sae aetlRsosblt 
0
(2) positive agreement of the parents,14 (3) preference of the chil-
dren,1 47 (4) ability and willingness of the parents to cooperate with
each other,1 48 (5) the particular psychological and emotional needs of
the children, 49 (6) the degree to which possible divided residential care
would disrupt the child's normal school and schedule, 5' and (7) the
age and maturity of the children.1 51 In the alternative, courts may em-
ploy a three prong test which directs the court to consider three essen-
tial factors. First, each parent must be individually fit to act as custo-
dian of the child. Second, the parents together must demonstrate an
ability to cooperate on matters affecting the child's welfare. The areas
in which cooperation is necessary range from practical considerations
to agreement on such fundamental issues as education, health care, dis-
cipline and religious training. Finally, if the above personal criteria are
met, the court, to protect the child's best interests, must be satisfied
that the proposed custodial arrangement is reasonable, and, on its face,
workable.1 52 Finally, the statute itself provides a guiding, but not exclu-
sive, list of ten factors affecting the best interests of the child.153
146. Id. at 5.25-.27.
147. Id. at 5.27-.29.
148. Id. at 5.30-.33.
149. Id. at 5.33-.34.
150. Id. at 5.34-.36.
151. Id. at 5.36-.40.
152. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.20.
153. Florida Statutes section 61.13(3) (1982) states:
(3) For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary physi-
cal residence, the best interests of the child shall be determined by the
court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best welfare
and interests of the child, including, but not limited to:
(a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child fre-
quent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent.
(b) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parents and the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial
care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in
lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining
301 1Shared Parental Responsibility7:1983
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Because the statute places a high standard of cooperation on par-
ents, specificity is imperative (1) in the delineation of what shared re-
sponsibility is to constitute for a given family and (2) for the continu-
ing success of the arrangement decided upon."" In addition, since the
statute contemplates joint legal custody and a judicial presumption ex-
ists in Florida against "divided" custody, 55 it is probable a child may
properly reside most of the year with one parent (i.e. primary resi-
dence), subject to reasonable "contact" (visitation) with the other par-
ent (i.e. secondary residence). However, both parents should have
shared control of the child's upbringing, care and education and equal
voice in decisions pertaining to the child's health, education, religious
training, vacations, etc.150
The statute requires parents to confer on these major decisions.
The requirement to confer, and the absence of the word "agree" in the
statute, provides legislative recognition that parents who are divorced
may be unable to agree but can be expected to confer and cooperate
continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding,
and experience to express a preference.
0) Any other factor considered by the court to be rele-
vant to a particular child custody dispute.
Id.
154. James Fox Miller, Melvyn Frumkes. See also Frumkes, Negotiating and
Drafting a Shared Parental Responsibility Agreement, MANUAL, supra note 115, at
4.1-.34 (therein are sample clauses to provide for any possible contingency, i.e. "emer-
gency decisions - unilateral permitted; [minimum] contact and access by the non-
residential parent; name to be maintained; failure to exercise [contact and access], no
waiver; daily decision- making responsibility; contingency for future change in circum-
stances; provision for future possible necessity of mediation and conciliation") (text
relating to each of these clauses has been deleted).
155. Judge Barkett.
156. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.5.
1302 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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with each other on major decisions in the best interests of the child.15 7
As a practical matter, minor decisions "such as what and when to eat,
when to do chores, and when to go to bed (i.e. day to day disciplines)
should be decided by the parent with whom the child's primary physi-
cal residence is maintained."158
Shared parental responsibility allows each parent to have his or
her wishes heard. Perhaps more importantly for the child, shared pa-
rental responsibility attempts to approximate as much as possible the
prior intact family unit.15' Additional benefits of the thus created
greater stability of the parental relationship, along with great psycho-
logical, philosophical, and physical involvement with the child by both
parents, hopefully will perpetuate the cycle of shared parenting cooper-
ation and flexibility160 and outweigh any risks.16'
2. Restricted Shared Parental Responsibility162
If it is determined by a Florida court that "shared parental re-
157. Judge Barkett, Judge Kapner.
158. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility. MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.5.
159. Kapner, Shared Parental Responsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 5.8.
160. Id. at 5.6-.13.
161. Id. at 5.13-.14.
For example, if factors such as parental maturity or fitness are negative,
shared responsibility, because of its greater reliance on cooperation and
flexibility, could run the risk of greater manipulation and arguments by
both the child and the parents. A child who is shuttled back and forth
between hostile parents of sharply different life-styles and disciplinary atti-
tudes can only experience more difficult adjustment problems than other-
wise. Some critics have opposed shared or joint responsibility on the
grounds that "change and discontinuity threaten the child's emotional
well-being; that joint custody requires the 'shuttling back and forth' of
children, leading to lack of stability in the home environment; that chil-
dren may become prey to severe and crippling loyalty conflicts."
Id.
162. This term appears in the MANUAL, supra note 115, at 4.18, adopted from
the guidelines prepared by the Family Law Division, 13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsbor-
ough County, Florida. Its definition follows Florida Statutes section 61.13 (1982):
In restricted shared parental responsibility, each parent's division of re-
sponsibility is set out. Areas of decision-making include, but are not lim-
3031
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sponsibility" is inappropriate in a given situation, the next statutory
alternative is not sole responsibility. 163 Rather, "parents may agree as
to the division of various aspects of parental responsibility although the
court has authority to reject and/or modify any such agreement"1 64 or
"the court may apportion the various aspects of parental care and con-
trol between the parties if such apportionment is: a) agreed to by the
parties or b) found by the court to be in the best interests of the
child."""'
Restricted shared parental responsibility is provided for in Florida
Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2.a. 66 This section of the statute is of
prime importance. It recognizes individual family uniqueness and gives
statutory authority for the myriad of orders that now can arise from
Florida Statutes section 61.13. Most importantly, it can be the basis for
awarding physical custody six months to one parent and six months to
the other or monthly variations thereof.1 6 7
ited to: residential care, education, religious, moral, disciplinary, medical
and dental, social, recreational, legal, travel and financial. Where the court
designates one parent as having primary responsibility, the court should do
so only after a finding that that parent is more likely to allow the child
frequent and continuing contact with the other parent.
Id. at 4.18-.19 (emphasis original).
163. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2.a. (1982).
164. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility MANUAL,,Supra note
115, at 1.19.
165. Id. at 1.18.
166. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2.a. (1982) states in part:
In ordering shared parental responsibility the court may consider the ex-
pressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate
responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare or may divide
those aspects between the parties based on the best interests of the child.
When it appears to the court to be in the best interests of the child, the
court may order or the parties may agree how any such responsibility will
be divided. Such areas of responsibility may include primary physical resi-
dence, education, medical and dental care, and any other responsibilities
which the court finds unique to a particular family and/or in the best in-
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3. Sole Parental Responsibility
The final statutory alternative of sole parental responsibility is not
favored in the statute and may only be ordered where the court has
determined that shared parental responsibility, whether unrestricted or
restricted, would be detrimental to the child.16 8 Detrimental is a
stronger term than "against the best interests of the child"' 169 and car-
ries with it a higher burden of proof on the parent requesting sole pa-
rental responsibility or on the court ordering it. 70 It is suggested that a
balancing test be applied and only when the risks of shared parenting
outweigh the benefits can the presumption in favor of shared parental
responsibility be overriden.17"
Sole parental responsibility implies parents are incapable of con-
ferring and cooperating and also "implies that the relationship with one
parent will-and-should be limited."1 2 Arguably, it may even be re-
quired173 that an agreement by the parents, who desire and have mutu-
ally agreed upon sole responsibility, shall state a finding "that shared
parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child."17 This may
168. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982) states in part: "If the court
determines that shared responsibility would be detrimental to the child, the court may
order sole parental responsibility." (emphasis added).
Sole parental responsibility is defined in section 61.13(2)(b)2.b. as: "responsibility
for the minor child ...given to one parent by the court, with or without rights of
visitation to the other parent." (emphasis added).
In section 61.13(2)(b)2.b., the word "visitation" is used. It is the opinion of this
author that the word as used in this section is in direct conflict with the deletion of the
same word in section 61.13(2)(b)1., and in conflict with the recognized need for new
terminology in the statute. It is therefore this author's recommendation that the word
"visitation" be replaced with the words "contact and access" by the legislature. "Con-
tact and access" are words borrowed from Melvyn Frumkes and appear in the MAN-
UAL, supra note 115, at 4.2-.3.
169. Judge Kapner.
170. Kapner, Shared Parental Responsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 5.7.
171. Id. at 5.14.
172. Id.
173. Divergence of view exists regarding whether an agreement or order for sole
responsibility must track the words "detrimental to the child" if both parents have
agreed that the sole responsibility is best for them. Judge Barkett and Melvyn Frumkes
said the words must appear; Judge Kapner said they need not appear.
174. FLA. STAX. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982).
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raise a constitutional issue. Parents may balk at being required to track
the words of the statute in a voluntary agreement for sole responsibil-
ity. If challenged, a requirement of including the exact language of the
statute in an agreement could be found to be an unconstitutional usur-
pation of parental rights when forced on parents against their will.1"5
4. Modification of a Previously Rendered Custody Award
Until the 1982 enactment of Florida Statutes section 61.13, Flor-
ida case law prescribed a material change of circumstances to warrant
modification of child custody. This may no longer be true in Florida;
there are three possible approaches to modification of custody as a re-
sult of the 1982 revisions to the statute. 17 6
Chapter 82-96, section 2 states that "the provisions of this act
shall be applicable to all proceedings under Chapter 61, Florida Stat-
utes, that are pending on the effective date of this act," 177 and section
4178 provides for a liberal construction of the statute. The above sec-
tions read in conjunction with the discretionary powers vested in the
courts by the legislature 17 9 furnish the basis for the alternative argu-
175. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). Based on this case, the State
of Florida may have to justify by clear and convincing evidence the intrusion on paren-
tal rights if the statute is interpreted to require a statement of a finding that shared
responsibility is detrimental to the child, if forced on parents against their wishes and
belief when they both desire sole responsibility for personal reasons.
Arguably, though, Santosky may not be applicable; it is a termination of parental
rights case and the issues as to custody and visitation may be considered entirely differ-
ent. Appellate review may clarify this issue.
176. Until a case reaches the Florida District Court of Appeal on this issue for
clarification, it is uncertain as to which standard will apply. This was a topic of discus-
sion at the Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education Committee Course on October 8,
1982. The possible positions discussed infra pages 306-309 come either from that
course or from the course manual.
177. 1982 FLA. LAWS ch. 82-96, § 3 (emphasis added). The word "pending" is
not defined by the legislature.
But see Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.24-.25 for Florida case law definitions of "pending."
178. Florida Laws chapter 82-96, section 4 (1982) states that "the provisions of
this act shall be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purposes of this
act." (emphasis added).
179. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
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ments on the central issue: In a court determination of a previously
rendered custody award, is the newly amended Florida Statutes section
61.13 enough of a changed circumstance itself to sustain a petition for
modification?
An unchanging court, following established case law,180 would say
no.181 A well-established rule of statutory construction states "that in
the absence of clear legislative expression to the contrary, a law is pre-
sumed to operate prospectively."1 82 This is to enable parties to rely on
the substantive rights created by the statute prior to the 1982 revi-
sions.183 Therefore, the prior two-prong test for modification 8 4 would
remain the standard of review under this view and "the provisions of
Cha. 82-96 should not be applied to proceedings for modification begun
prior to the effective date of Cha. 82-96 if a final judgment of dissolu-
tion of marriage awarding custody has previously been rendered."' 1815
Under this conservative view, Florida Statutes section 61.13 cannot be
the sole basis for modification of a prior custody award. 186
On the other hand, a liberal court could find that there is clear
legislative expression in the statute1 7 to warrant finding the statute
180. See, e.g., Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464 (Fla. 1933).
181. "Where child custody award is rendered prior to the effective date of chap-
ter 82-96, such child custody award may not be modified without a substantial change
of circumstances." Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra
note 115, at 1.26. Melvyn Frumkes also holds this view.
182. Id. at 1.23. But by examining the statute itself, it could be argued the legis-
lature, by specific changes, has implied the contrary. Florida Statutes section
61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) which states in part: "The court shall determine all matters relat-
ing to the custody of each minor child of the parties as a part of any proceeding under
this chapter. . . ." The words emphasized were added in the 1982 revision. In addi-
tion, the words that had previously followed chapter - "for dissolution of marriage"
- were deleted. These changes could indicate a broader, rather than narrower, reading
of the above phrase.
183. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.23.
184. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
185. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.25.
186. Id. at 1.26. Two additional arguments are set forth on pages 1.26-.27.
187. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) states in part: "It is the public
policy of this state. . . to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of
child-rearing." See also supra note 183.
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alone provides standing to seek modification. Under this view, because
the legislative public policy statement is clear and the provisions of the
act are to "be liberally construed to effectively carry out the purposes
of this act,"188 it could be argued the aforementioned rule of statutory
construction is inapplicable. Therefore, a court adhering to this broad
view would allow a modification proceeding based solely upon the
changed circumstance of the revised Florida Statutes section 61.13,189
even if a final judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding custody
has previously been rendered. 190
Adhering to a middle-of-the-road view, a moderate court may find
standing to seek modification dependent on the specific circumstances
in each case.191 A threshold of changed circumstances would probably
still be required. 92 If a prior modification order came about after liti-
gation of a custody dispute and the court based its decision on the prior
facts and law, the court may be able to review the order if it appears
the parties requested and were refused shared parental responsibility
because of the then existing law.193
Until this issue receives appellate review in Florida, no clear stan-
dard may exist as to modification of a previously rendered custody
188. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
189. Judge Barkett holds this view. Judge Barkett also stated that where a prior
custody order was followed by numerous contempt hearings, review should be allowed.
190. Thus, a judge could give retroactive application to chapter 82-96 and not
address the issue of impairment of vested rights. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental
Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.28-.29.
191. Judge Kapner holds this view.
192. According to Judge Kapner, if the child is now much older than when the
original custody agreement was made, this fact alone could be enough of a changed
circumstance to authorize standing to seek modification. This would seem to be a lesser
burden of proof than substantial or material change required by prior Florida case law.
See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
Also, Judge Kapner suggests the intent of the original agreement between the par-
ties could be examined. Even though a pre-existing agreement does not reflect the lan-
guage of shared responsibility, if the parties intended to share parental responsibility,
the order may be changed to reflect the new terminology of Florida Statutes section
61.13 (1982).
193. Judge Kapner. Shared parental responsibility may now only be refused
upon a finding that such an order would be detrimental to the child. FLA. STAT. §
61.13(2)(b)2. (1982).
1308 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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5. Grandparents Given Standing to Enforce Visitation
Florida Statutes section 61.13 has been amended to provide grand-
parents with "legal standing to seek judicial enforcement" of an award
of visitation.195 "It is unclear whether or not grandparents have legal
standing to file or participate in an initial petition or a petition for
modification of a final judgment so as toobtain visitation privileges.",,"
Since, under Florida Statutes section 61.13, the court shall determine
all matters relating to custody in accordance with the Uniform Child
Custody Act197 which provides that all parties with an interest in the
proceeding should be named, there is an argument for allowing grand-
parents to participate in either petition.1 98 Also, "if the grandparents do
not commence a proceeding, there seems to be no prohibition against a
trial court modifying a custody award so as to grant grandparents visi-
tation and allowing grandparents to participate in the proceeding."1 9
C. Can It Work?: Problems and Their Possible Resolution
Florida Statutes section 61.13 now specifically encourages parents
to share all the rights and responsibilities of raising a child,20 0 and rec-
ognizes that a myriad of alternative orders may result.201 Setting aside
the major unresolved judicial issue of modification,202 there will be
three general problem areas for parties in reaching an agreement of
shared parental responsibility: "(1) division of time; (2) issues concern-
194. The entire panel of speakers agreed to the lack of consensus as to how this
issue will be resolved in the courts.
195. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. (1982) states in part: "Grandpar-
ents shall have legal standing to seek judicial enforcement of such an award."
196. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.29-.30.
197. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
198. MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.30, (citing Putnal v. Putnal, 3,92 So. 2d 613
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
199. Id.
200. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
201. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982).
202. See supra notes 176-94.and accompanying text.
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ing the child's welfare; and (3) money."203 Again, all of these can be
handled in an infinite number of ways depending on the specific cir-
cumstances of each family.
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage where there are minor
children, the court has the authority to: "Order either or both parties to
consult with a marriage counselor, psychologist, psychiatrist, minister,
priest, rabbi or any other person deemed qualified by the court and
acceptable to the party or parties ordered to seek consultation,"' ' to
aid the parties in coming to an agreement. Extra judicial means of res-
olution are necessary both to reach such an agreement and to decide
any unforseeable disputes. 5
In conjunction with the amendments Florida Statutes section
61.13 passed under 1982 Florida Laws chapter 82-96, Florida Statutes
section 61.21 was created to authorize the counties in Florida to "es-
tablish a family mediation or conciliation service to assist parties in
resolving any controversy involving the family." 06 This statute also
provides that the court can refer the parties to the service upon motion
of a party or upon its own motion; 07 that all verbal and written com-
munications which occur during the mediation or conciliation proceed-
ings be considered confidential and inadmissible as evidence in subse-
quent legal proceedings, unless the parties agree otherwise; 208 and that
203. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.22. Specificity in all three general areas of potential dispute is absolutely
necessary for shared responsibility to be successful.
A major specific problem to be addressed relates to Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So.
2d 27 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), a recent decision which appears to inhibit the
ability of the primary residential parent to leave Florida, notwithstanding the absence
of specific words in an agreement to that effect. Melvyn Frumkes suggested that speci-
ficity in an agreement on this issue is necessary as a result of GiachettL
204. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(b)(1) quoted by Knight & Pollock, Shared Paren-
tal Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.32.
205. Knight & Pollock, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.22.
206. Florida Statutes section 61.21(1) (1982) states: "Counties may establish a
family mediation or conciliation service to assist parties in resolving any controversy
involving the family." (emphasis added).
207. Florida Statutes section 61.21(2) (1982) states: "The court on its own mo-
tion or on motion of a party may refer the parties to this service." (emphasis added).
208. Florida Statutes section 61.21(3) (1982) states: "All verbal or written com-
munications in mediation or conciliation proceedings shall be confidential and inadmis-
sible las evidence in any subsequent legal proceeding, unless both parties agree
34
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/3
1 7:1983 Shared Parental Responsibility 311
a family mediation and conciliation service serves a valid purpose and
is authorized to be funded either by general county revenues or by levy-
ing a service charge of no more than two dollars on any circuit court
proceeding.20 9 This "court-connected alternative to the adversary pro-
cess" is the legislative answer to the unique problems in the area of
domestic relations. 210
Florida Statutes section 61.21 contains no provision mandating
mediation or conciliation. Also, this statute does not effectuate the
court's determination because all happenings during mediation are con-
fidential and inadmissible in court unless the parties agree otherwise.
This is where this new shared parental responsibility statute falls short.
Recognizing that agreements between the parties are to be encouraged
and that very few of the shared responsibility agreements will be done
within the framework of the adversary system in court,211 the imple-
mentation of the purposes of Florida Statutes section 61.13 cannot be
accomplished without further action by the legislature. Arguably at
least one mediation session, preferably a minimum of three should be
required. 212 Although a counter-argument can be made that parties
should not be forced into mediation,13 in order to (1) identify the par-
otherwise."
209. Florida Statutes section 61.21(4) (1982) states: "A family mediation or
conciliation service is hereby declared to serve a valid public purpose. The board of
county commissioners may support such a service by appropriating moneys from
county revenues or by levying a service charge of no more than $2 on any circuit court
proceeding."
210. Orlando, Mediation and Conciliation Under Section 61.21, MANUAL, supra
note 115, at 3.1. Judge Orlando defines mediation and conciliation, and distinguishes
them from negotiation and arbitration. Id. at 3.1-.2.
211. Judge Orlando.
212. Judge Orlando said that ninety-five percent of the parties after three ses-
sions of mediation come to some agreement or overcome post-judgment problems. See
also Joint Custody Legislation Passed by 23 States, supra note 2, at 2507:
The new Iowa statute which takes effect July 1, 1982 ... stipulates that
on the application of either parent, the court shall consider granting joint
custody even in cases where the parents do not agree to it. Before ruling on
the petition in such a case, the court may require the parties to participate
in custody mediation counseling to determine whether joint custody is in
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ties as good candidates for shared parental responsibility,214 (2) aid
parties in the stress of divorce to reach the specificity of agreement that
will be necessary on the logistics of shared parental responsibility, (3)
resolve problems, and (4) to truly lessen litigation in this area,215
mandatory mediation sessions with some form of court access to recom-
mendations of the mediator, will assist in making the shared parental
responsibility enactment, Statutes section 61.13, workable in the state
of Florida.2"'
V. Conclusion
With the enactment of the 1982 revisions to Florida Statutes sec-
tion 61.13, the Florida legislature reaffirmed the court's wide discretion
in the area of child custody to focus on the specific circumstances of
the case and to determine what is in the best interests of the child. The
legislature has incorporated by statute joint legal custody, using the
innovative terminology of shared responsibility.
By creating a presumption for shared parental responsibility and
expressing, in mandatory language, Florida's public policy of encourag-
ing both parents to share the rights and responsibilities of raising the
child, courts must make all efforts to accomplish that end. Specific
214. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.21-.22.
215. There is concern that Florida Statutes section 61.13 (1982) will result in an
overload of cases flooding the courts. During the panel discussion on October 8, 1982, a
suggestion arose that Florida should join many other states in creating a family court
division in which judges would only hear domestic relations problems. To prevent high
"burn-out" of judges in this emotional area, it was suggested also that this division be
"underloaded." Melvyn Frumkes and James Fox Miller agreed with creating a family
court division in Florida.
216. In California, mediation is mandatory where there is a custody issue. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1982).
Judge Orlando stated that at the present time it would appear that private practi-
tioners in Florida cannot provide mediation services because of ethics problems. Or-
lando, The Nuts and Bolts of Mediation, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 3.6. As media-
tion becomes a more widely used tool and recognized as a means to incorporate shared
parental responsibility in agreements thus lessening litigation, alternatives to the ethics
problems facing attorneys arguably should be considered. The county-formed family
mediation or conciliation service may not be able to handle alone the large number of
possible parties. FLA. STAT. § 61.21(1), (4) (1982).
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guidelines are provided to aid the court in its determination. The judi-
cial presumption against divided custody makes it unlikely that the
physical residence of the child will be equally shared six months with
each parent. But if the circumstances so warrant, i.e. equally divided
physical custody is workable for the family, the statute provides the
authority for the courts to so order.
Parents are now expected to confer on major aspects of child-rear-
ing although agreement between the parents is not required in the stat-
ute. Should it become evident to the court that the parents are unable
to confer, a variety of orders may result, thus dividing ultimate respon-
sibility for aspects of child-rearing between the two. Sole responsibility
is the last alternative, only ordered upon a showing that shared respon-
sibility would be detrimental to the child's best interests.
In addition to the changes in semantics and the increased empha-
sis on individual circumstances, the Florida legislature has accom-
plished specific substantive changes. The demise of the tender years
doctrine is statutorily mandated. Grandparents now have standing to
seek judicial enforcement of a visitation award. The parent with whom
the child does not primarily reside now has access to records pertaining
to that child.
However, certain problem areas remain. Until a modification peti-
tion receives appellate review, the standard of review for modification
of custody remains uncertain. Although the legislature authorized a
new statute providing for mediation and arbitration, there is no
mandatory participation required as an extra-judicial means for the
parents in executing and implementing a custody agreement. Until re-
education of parents, citizens, and attorneys occurs regarding the
meaning of shared responsibility, the fears and reluctance related to
this joint legal custody statute will slow its total implementation by the
courts and full incorporation in agreements. Finally, we must await ju-
dicial clarification of the 1982 revisions of Florida's shared parental
responsibility statute through appellate review to provide full under-
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